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The Untold Story of America's First
Sentencing Commission

Norval Morris bubbled with ideas, many of them involving
work for other people to do. This article tells the story of
one of Norval's good ideas which, alas, came to naught,
but which, had its lessons been heeded, might have
helped makers of sentencing policy, especially federal policy, avoid what are now widely seen as major mistakes,
including some that led to the Federal Guidelines' eventual implosion.
In the 197os, Norval and Hans W. Mattick directed the
University of Chicago Law School's Center for Studies in
Criminal Justice. Frank Zimring was "associate" director
(later he became the director). I put Frank's title in quotes
because he claimed the role obliged him to do no administrative work but only to associate with the directors and
the people they assembled. In December 1971, I began
working at the center.
From my earliest days there, Hans and Frank warned
that anyone having lunch with Norval risked leaving the
table with work to do concerning one of Norval's good
ideas. That happened to me a fair number of times including, a half dozen years later, in 1977, when Norval
suggested that we attempt a trial run of the work of a sentencing commission. Judge Marvin Frankel's proposal first
appeared in writing in 19 7 2, but no jurisdiction acted on it

until Minnesota created its commission in 1978. Late in
1975, Senator Edward Kennedy had introduced Senate Bill
2699, the first legislative proposal for creation of a sentencing commission, but in 1977 the commission
remained mostly a gleam in Judge Frankel's eyes.
The mock sentencing commission self-destructed after
three meetings. We met in Chicago at several month intervals and worked through agendas, with some issues new
each time, and some second or third looks at subjects preciously canvassed. "Staff issues papers," which I wrote,
and packets of photocopied background materials were
distributed.
Some of what later went disastrously wrong with the
U.S. Sentencing Commission could have been predicted
from the exercise. Many federal judges, for example, suffer from an exaggerated deference to what they consider to
be expressions of legislative policy, and this bedeviled both
the mock and the federal commissions. The intimidating
and off-putting forty-three-level federal grid is one result.

The mock commission, like the later federal one, recognized the problems prosecutorial powers presented to a
meaningful system of guidelines; the mock commission
ducked; the federal commission acted, but unwisely. The
"relevant conduct" and "acceptance of responsibility" provisions are results.
The mock commission, taking seriously Frankel's call
for an administrative agency led by experts, prominently
included academics among its members; both in the exercise and in life, this proved disastrous. The Federal
Guidelines' excruciating detail and their ambition to
micromanage complex local processes from Washington
are among the results.
The mock commission exercise demonstrated that a
commission's task was much more difficult than Marvin
Frankel (or anyone else) recognized. In retrospect, enactment of the federal legislation, despite its ten-year
gestation, was premature. It came much too soon, before
the experiments in Brandeis's state laboratories had
shown what commissions and guidelines could and could
not do. It is possible, of course, that a federal commission
with better members, less fractious and containing fewer
people angling for higher federal offices, would have done
a better job, but I am skeptical about that. Many more
early state commissions failed than succeeded. In the
political pressure cooker that Washington was (and is),
chances are slim that any group of commissioners would
have behaved as the nonpartisan technocratic body of
semi-politically-insulated experts Frankel envisioned.
I tell the story in three parts. The first describes the
mock sentencing commission project. The second
describes the results. The third considers the question
whether, in light of the mock project's results, the grosser
errors of the federal commission could have been avoided.
That answer is no.
I. The Mock Sentencing Commission Project
The Federal Guidelines have been around for nearly a
quarter century. Most sentencing law scholars began paying attention to the subject in the mid-i99os or more
recently with the boom in interest dating from Blakely and
Booker. Few now active are likely to remember the state of
sentencing law and policy as they existed before 198o.
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Some reminders are a necessary backdrop to my story.
From the early 1930S until 1975, when Maine abolished
parole release, every U.S. jurisdiction had a roughly similar system of individualized, indeterminate sentencing.
Before 1975, judges had near unlimited discretion over
who went to jail or prison, and if to prison over nominal
minimum and maximum sentences.' I wrote nominal
because statutes sometimes set minimum sentences for
every offense at one year, because parole boards determined actual release dates (sometimes constrained by
judges' decisions about minimums and maximums), and
because prison officials could reduce maximum and
sometimes minimum sentences by a third to a half
through award and removal of time off for good behavior.
Influential objections were made to indeterminate sentencing beginning in the late 1950s 2 and were offered with
increasing vigor thereafter. Some people, including Judge
Frankel, were concerned about the broad discretion of
judges and parole boards, the inevitability of unwarranted
disparities, the risks of arbitrariness and caprice, and the
dangers of conscious racial bias and unconscious racial
stereotypes. Some were concerned about procedural fairness, some about the effectiveness, feasibility, and
morality of correctional treatment programs, and some
about the absence from sentencing of concerns for proportionality and retribution)
Justice Frankel's proposals were first offered in an article in the University of CincinnatiLaw Review4 and were
more fully elaborated in his Criminal Sentences-Law without Order.5 Yale Law School professor Daniel I. Freed
convened a seminar to consider Judge Frankel's proposal
and flesh it out. The fruits of those discussions became
the basis of Senator Kennedy's Senate Bill 2699 and were
6
eventually published.
Frankel's proposal contained five main elements: establishment of a nonpartisan administrative agency called a
sentencing commission; recognition of the commission as
an expert body largely insulated from short-term political
influence; appointment to the commission of a distinguished group of practitioners, policy makers, and
academics; promulgation by the commission of law-like
rules or guidelines; and provision for appellate review of
sentences imposed other than as authorized by applicable
guidelines.
By 1977, Senator Kennedy's bill had put the idea of a
commission before Congress. But since no jurisdiction
had established or operated a sentencing commission,
Norval proposed over lunch that we try to simulate the
work of such a body in hopes of informing the work of real
commissions when and if any were established. Frank and
I thought that a capital idea. It might be fun, could do no
harm, and might even prove useful. Funding was obtained
from the National Institute of Corrections, then headed by
Allen Breed, a career corrections professional who had
recently completed a decade as head of the California
Youth Authority. Norval was the ersatz chair, I was the
ersatz staff, and Frank associated with us.
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We took Frankel's call for a distinguished membership
seriously. Here is the group we assembled:
Norman Carlson (Director, U.S. Bureau of Prisons)
Ronald Gainer (senior career official in the U.S. Department of Justice responsible for congressional liaison
concerning a proposed federal criminal code)
Marvin Frankel (federal District Court judge)
Andrew von Hirsch (author of DoingJustice7 and soon
to join the faculty of the Rutgers University Graduate
School of Criminal Justice)
Peter Hoffman (Research Director, U.S. Parole Commission, and one of the pioneers in development of
parole and voluntary sentencing guidelines 8)
Harold "Ace" Tyler (in private practice but formerly a
federal Court of Appeals judge and Deputy U.S. Attorney General)
Hans Zeisel (sociologist and statistician at the University of Chicago Law School; best-known for his work on
the Chicago Jury Project9)
Franklin Zimring (enfant terrible, University of
Chicago Law School)
In addition, Norman Carlson was accompanied at each
meeting by his senior assistant and eventual successor
Michael Quinlan.
The group thus included a federal trial judge (Frankel),
a former federal appellate judge (Tyler), senior Department of Justice officials (Tyler and Gainer), a senior prison
official (Carlson), and a senior parole official (Hoffman). It
included someone already deeply versed in guidelines
development (Hoffman), well-known sentencing reform
advocates (Frankel, von Hirsch, Morris), a distinguished
statistician (Zeisel), and a well-known lawyer/social scientist (Zimring). All the then-conventional bases were
covered except for criminal defense.' No legislators were
included; one of Frankel's principal arguments for a politically insulated specialized commission is that legislatures
are institutionally ill-suited to develop and oversee sentencing policy. The stage was set.
II. The Results: Strike Three...
Like the federal sentencing commission nearly a decade
later, we wildly underestimated the work involved. The
mock commission met three times and was so badly
divided on basic issues that we abandoned the venture. We
were not alone in this; subsequent commissions in New
Mexico, Maine, and New York also decided the job was
undoable or not worth doing. The Pennsylvania commission's first proposed guidelines were rejected by the
legislature. Other early commissions, notably in Minnesota and Washington, blessed with remarkable
'2
leadership," were much more successful.
As the mock commission's sole staff member, I prepared background papers for each meeting.' 3 In
retrospect, they were not half bad. The first one offered a

NO. 4 •

APRIL 2009

tour d'horizon of contemporaneous sentencing policy
developments and set out an agenda of issues to be
addressed. It highlighted the need to structure the exercise of prosecutorial discretion as a component of any
meaningful sentencing reform. The background papers
for the subsequent meetings offered analyses and set out
options concerning issues discussed at earlier meetings.
The rest of this section discusses the issues over which
we stumbled.
A. Prosecutorial Discretion
I was pleased with the way I had taken the "hydraulic
theory of discretion" seriously in the first backgrounder
and shown that any meaningfully constraining system
of sentencing guidelines would shift power to prosecutors. This, given prosecutors' advocacy role and the
political dimensions of their work, seemed an obviously
bad idea. I suggested a number of ways the commission
might address the problem (e.g., explicit guilty plea discounts of various kinds, guidelines for charging and
plea negotiation).4
No one was persuaded. The judges (Frankel, Tyler
wearing both his hats) were adamant that separation of
powers considerations precluded commission development of prosecutorial guidelines. Others thought that
realpolitik considerations would make development of
enforceable prosecution guidelines politically impossible.
My proposals were abandoned. One state, Washington,
later in its sentencing commission enabling legislation
authorized development of prosecutorial guidelines.
Those that were developed were vague and general in their
phrasing and explicitly provided that their nonapplication
did not raise appealable issues.
If only the U.S. Sentencing Commission had reached
the same conclusion as the mock commission. The federal
commission tried indirectly to counterbalance increased
prosecutorial powers. In my view, the resulting relevant
conduct provisions requiring judges to impose sentences
on the basis of "actual offense behavior" found on the
basis of a civil law standard, even when charges had not
been filed, had been dismissed, or had resulted in an
acquittal, undermined the Federal Guidelines' moral force
and legitimacy more than any other mistake the federal
commission made.'5 The relevant conduct provision, however, had multiple objectives and cannot solely be
explained by reference to efforts to constrain prosecutorial
powers. I explain below the other reason why the commission made that fatal mistake.
B. Structural Formalism
My first staff paper proposed a number of formats that
guidelines might take. Partly these were based on various
grid formats used in earlier parole and voluntary sentencing guidelines systems, and partly I made them up (e.g.,
"telephone book" guidelines in which numbers are
expressed in narrative form, like those later developed in
6
Delaware and elsewhere).'
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The mock commission made no progress on this subject, largely because of the position adamantly taken by
Judge Tyler and Ronald Gainer that any guidelines had
explicitly to authorize the full range of sentences provided
by statute for particular offenses. If statutes authorized a
thirty-year sentence for a particular offense, the guidelines, they reasoned, must specify what kinds of cases
should receive sentences at various points within that
range, including at its upper bound. Other members were
just as adamantly of the view that such detailed guidelines
were inadvisable and would prove unworkable.
Most state guidelines subsequently took the position
that guidelines should specify ranges of presumptive (or
advisory) sentences for normal or typical cases and, to provide for especially serious cases, authorized upward
departures for which reasons must be given. Judge Tyler
would not accept that as an adequate way to recognize
Congress's implicit intention. Perhaps his view would
have been different if systems like those in Minnesota,
Pennsylvania, and Washington (the first three state systems) had then been available to demonstrate a different
approach. In any case, though the subject was addressed
at each meeting, no agreement was ever reached.
To my bewilderment, at the time and since, and despite
the availability as models of state systems of the sort just
described, Judge Tyler's argument resurfaced in the
1985-87 deliberations of the U.S. Sentencing Commission.
Both (then) First Circuit Court of Appeals judge Stephen
Breyer and Second Circuit judge Jon Newman, an especially active and influential kibitzer, were adamantly of the
view that the guidelines must explicitly (e.g., not by way of
ad hoc upward departures) authorize sentences filling in
the full range of statutorily authorized sentences. The
result, given the statutory requirement that the upper limit
of a guideline range not exceed the lower limit by more
than 25 percent, was a federal grid with forty-three levels,
many more than in any state system.'7 The "sentencing
machine" problem, that overly complex, nonintuitive
guidelines would lack surface logic and for that reason be
seen as illegitimate as a device for dispensing justice to
8
individuals, was already well-known.
C. An Elite Commission
No real sentencing commission has come close to matching the distinction of membership of our mock
commission. The federal commission, with its mix of federal judges (William Wilkins, Stephen Breyer, George
MacKinnon), a retired corrections official (Helen Corrothers), and three academics (Paul Robinson, Michael
Block, Ilene Nagel), came closest.
Two sets of theoretical issues fractured the mock commission and particularly its academics. Andrew von
Hirsch and I both believed the exercise should begin with
selection of a set of normative principles to guide the commission's policy work. We were sure we were right. Others
were just as sure we were wrong and being a bit pointyheaded. Ronald Gainer in particular strongly believed that
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guidelines should take account of the utilitarian purposes
particular sentences should serve and that the guidelines
should specify how that might be done. Judges, in his
model, would be required to indicate the fractions of a
prison sentence predicated on retributive, incapacitative,
and deterrent considerations. Resolution of the issue was
deferred at the ends of the first and second meetings and
became irrelevant when we disbanded after the third.
More spirited and irresolvable disagreements broke out
between Hans Zeisel (with Marvin Frankel in support) and
Frank Zimring over technical issues relating to the development of baseline data on past sentencing practices to
inform guideline development. I cannot remember what
the issues were, suggesting that they may not have been
absolutely central to guidelines development.
No matter. The disagreements though adamant were
not acrimonious, perhaps because we all realized we were
playing a game. Norval, whose (warranted) reputation as a
gracious host matched his scholarly recognition, tried his
best to bridge the gaps. Most of the meetings began with
dinners at his house the night before, and all contained
lots of time for schmoozing. To no avail. The key point
may be that leading so talented and self-confident a group
is, to use the academic dich6, a bit like herding cats.
Similar problems bedeviled the federal commission.
Some of the differences that divided the initial commission proved irresolvable, and the disagreements, perhaps
because the people involved were not playing a game,
were acrimonious. Two of the academic members, (then)
Rutgers University law professor Paul Robinson and University of Arizona econometrician Michael Block, and
Ronald Gainer, the Department of Justice's ex officio
member, resigned over issues of principle (though different principles). Robinson resigned because he believed the
initial guidelines were insufficiently detailed and prescriptive to encompass culpability distinctions that a principled
sentencing system should recognize. Block, a political conservative who believed that increased prison populations
are neither a human rights nor a significant financial
problem, nonetheless resigned because, he said, the commission in revising its initial guidelines did so for political
rather than for evidence-based reasons. Gainer's explanation was similar.
The killer conflict, which laid the foundation for the
Federal Guidelines' ultimate evisceration, occurred
because the chairman, Judge William Wilkins, for reasons
that presumably only he could explain, created two commission working groups charged to develop draft
guidelines. One, headed by Paul Robinson, created exquisitely detailed "desert" guidelines that took nuanced
account of offense characteristics relating to offenders'
culpability and the harms they risked or inflicted.'9
The other, led by econometrician Michael Block and
sociologist Ilene Nagel, attempted to develop "crime control" guidelines based on empirical evidence relating to the
deterrent, incapacitative, and rehabilitative effects of sanctions. Block and Nagel in time concluded that adequate
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empirical evidence to formulate such guidelines did not
exist, and their group abandoned the effort.
That left the work of Robinson's committee. A discussion set of draft culpability-based guidelines was
distributed for comment to selected federal judges and
some other people. Among other things, in order meaningfully to take proportionate account of financial losses
and harms, it called for calculations of square roots for
losses above one specified threshold, and cube roots for
losses above another." Robinson's proposals did not win
wide favor, and he eventually resigned because the guidelines the commission promulgated were insufficiently
detailed.
However, because Robinson's were the only draft
guidelines around, they served as the basis for those ultimately promulgated. The square and cube roots
disappeared, as did some of the detail, but three critical
features remained. First, the Federal Guidelines were by
orders of magnitude more detailed than any state guideline system before or since; this dovetailed nicely with the
forty-three-level grid since the details of weapons use, victim injury, property loss, and offense roles provided the
mechanism to move offenses up the grid (and a few other
details provided some opportunities to move downward).
Second, the details were far more refined than offense elements defined in federal criminal law; the answer was to
direct judges to find "sentencing facts" according to a civil
law evidentiary standard. Third, if the details found by
judges were to determine sentence lengths, the problem
of increased prosecutorial powers would loom even larger.
The result was the relevant conduct rule.
Only in Norval's mock sentencing commission project
and the federal commission were academics assigned
major policy roles to play, and only there did they comprise a large fraction of the commissions' members. Other
commissions have occasionally had academic members,
but they have seldom been major players.
The federal commission's failures cannot all be discredited to its academic members. The Reagan
administration predictably undermined any hope that the
commission would act as a politically insulated, nonpartisan body by appointing highly political people as
members. Chairman William Wilkins had been a senior
staffer for Republican Senator Strom Thurman, and
Stephen Breyer had been a senior assistant to Senator
Edward Kennedy. Both had been appointed to the federal
bench. Wilkins unsuccessfully sought appointment as FBI
director, and both sought (and in due course obtained)
appointments to higher courts, effectively ensuring that
the commission would, during their periods of involvement, be highly sensitive to political issues and politicians'
preferences. Not much was left of Judge Frankel's notion
of a politically insulated expert body that would handle the
details of sentencing policy in much the ways that the Federal Reserve Board handled fiscal policy and the Securities
and Exchange Commission in some periods (though not
recently) handled regulation of the securities industry.
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III. Was the Federal Disaster Inevitable?
The rationale for the mock sentencing commission project
was that real commissions might be able to learn something useful from the experience of their pretend
predecessor. That was a reasonable rationale in the mid1970s. Judge Frankel's idea had evolved from a law review
article to a book to a fuller model developed by the Yale
Law School group to bills introduced in the Congress.
Elaboration of the model through a simulation that would
in turn influence the work of a real commission seemed
like a logical next step in a rational process. It is natural to
wonder whether, had it not self-destructed, the mock commission's experience might have influenced the real
commission's work.
I am certain the mock commission's experience did
not influence the federal commission's work, and reasonably certain it could not have. Because nothing was ever
published about the mock commission project, and since
the federal commission did not begin work until 1985,
more than seven years later, those may seem self-evident
conclusions. That, however, is not why the mock commission project had no influence. Nearly all the people
principally involved in the mock commission were in the
mid-i98os alive and active in sentencing and corrections
policy issues. Frankel continued to promote his proposal;
Hoffman, Carlson, and Gainer continued in their senior
roles; Morris, von Hirsch, and I acted as advisers to the
early state commissions.
What changed was the political climate. When Frankel
first made his proposal, and for a decade afterward, criminal justice policy making was largely an exercise in
bureaucratic rationality. The idea of creating a politically
insulated expert body to develop sentencing policies was
not especially controversial (though sentencing guidelines
were, especially among judges).
When the federal guidelines commission was
appointed, however, the policy climate was radically different. Law-and-order sentiment was rampant. The Reagan
administration made no effort to insulate the commission
from political influence. The appointment of ambitious
former senior staffers to Senators Thurman and Kennedy
to lead the commission ensured that the commission
would be highly sensitive to political pressures. The
appointment of two conservative judges (Wilkins and
MacKinnon) and three conservative academics (Robinson,
Nagel, Block) to a seven-member commission ensured
that the group would lack political or ideological balance,
as did the absence of anyone with a criminal defense background. The failure to appoint any commissioner with
sentencing policy experience and later the commission's
decision that it had nothing to learn from the successful
state commissions meant that it was starting from scratch,
as if there were not already fifteen years' thinking and (in
Minnesota) six years' experience to draw on.
The Reagan administration was apparently not much
interested in sentencing reform and waited nearly a year
after enactment of the enabling legislation in 1984 to
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nominate people to serve as commissioners. The backgrounds of those nominated showed that relevant
experience had little to do with the selection criteria.
Although three members were judges, none had recent
trial experience and two (Wilkins and Breyer) were
appointed primarily because of their political connections (Robinson also was a former Senate staffer).
Breyer had been appointed directly to the First Circuit,
so never worked as a trial judge. Wilkins had served as a
trial judge only for a few years, and George MacKinnon,
in his eighties when appointed, was a retired court of
appeals judge. None of the three academics had experience as a criminal court or criminal justice practitioner.
Only Helen Corrothers, a former parole board member,
had any firsthand practice experience in the corrections
system. So much for Judge Frankel's ideas about political insulation and about an "expert" commission. It
seems unlikely that any other group of commissioners
the Reagan administration might have appointed would
have resembled Frankel's model much more closely.
Policy making about sentencing ought to be rational,
strategic, and cumulative, and in some American states it
was through the end of the 198os. In some American
states it is again. The federal commission and guidelines,
however, have never recovered from the blunders made in
the 198os. Norval's initiative to test-drive a sentencing
commission was a good one. Had the federal commission
been institutionally capable of paying attention, the federal
sentencing system of the past twenty years might have
been much less awful.
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